What makes some act immoral? While Western theories of morality often define harmful behaviors as centrally immoral, whether or not this is applicable to other cultures is still under debate. In particular, Confucianism emphasizes civilized behavior as fundamental to moral excellence. We designed three studies examining how the word "immoral" is used by Chinese and Westerners. Layperson-generated examples were used to examine cultural differences in which behaviors are called "immoral" (Study 1, N = 609; Study 2, N = 480), and whether "immoral" behaviors were best characterized as particularly harmful vs.
with an important caveat: rather than focusing on absolute and abstract obligations, it elaborates on the importance of a cultured, cultivated character, sublimely attentive to the social requirements of the situation, as the guide of virtuous and appropriate behavior. A corollary to this moral focus on character cultivation is that Chinese law has historically separated morality from law, seeing criminal law (and not morality) as a motivational tool applicable only to deviants whose behavior falls well beyond the bounds of civility and who are unmotivated by the search for virtue (Bakken, 2000; A. H.-Y. Chen, 2011) . Virtuous character is shown in small daily actions rather than avoidance of serious crimes.
Chinese moral education has been effectively synonymous with Confucian moral education for more than 2000 years (Li, Zhong, Lin, & Zhang, 2004) , and even now Confucian values influence the mandatory moral education courses in both primary and secondary schools in Mainland China (Reed, 1995; Zhan & Ning, 2004) , both in inculcating specific virtues such as filial piety but also in a general emphasis on cultivation of moral character and appropriateness. For example, contemporary policies on moral education in Mainland China emphasize cultivation and civility: "The fundamental task of … moral education work is to cultivate students as citizens who… have public morality and civilized behavior and customs" (Article 5, Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China, 2006) .
Civility vs. Harm as Morally Relevant
Influenced by a culturally based moral emphasis on character cultivation, Chinese lay moral cognition may be closely tied to judgments of civility and politeness. In particular, issues of harm, rights, and freedom infringement may not be closely associated with Chinese "moral" considerations. This would be in contrast to both classic and recent psychology theories of morality which argue that moral judgment is universally based on perceptions of harm and suffering, justice and fairness (Gray et al., 2014; Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013; Royzman, Leeman, & Baron, 2009; Turiel, 1983) . For example, Gray et al. (2014) have recently argued that accounts of moral instincts apparently founded on other principles (purity, loyalty, etc.) can be ultimately explained as concerns about harm.
Culture-minded psychologists have argued that these theories reflect a Western cultural bias; the "thinner and less binding morality" of modern Gesellshaft cultures (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010, p. 800) , where communal and hierarchical relationships are less emphasized (Rai & Fiske, 2011) , may have led to a moral emphasis on harm and unjust infringement of others' basic individual rights. In non-Western cultures, other issues might be perceived as more relevant to moral judgment (Graham et al., 2011; Haidt & Joseph, 2007; Rai & Fiske, 2011; Shweder et al., 1997) . Might immorality and harm be most strongly linked in the minds of those influenced by Western cultures, while those influenced by Chinese cultures have stronger non-harm-based conceptions of morality?
Moral vs. Non-Moral Norms: A Prototype Approach
The moralization of a behavior is assumed to be the first step in evoking the specific mental processes of moral cognition (Monin et al., 2007; Rozin, 1999) . Moral norms may be distinguishable from norms about "aesthetic, religious, legal, or economic judgments" (Sinnott-Armstrong & Wheatley, 2013, p. 2) , from conventions or issues of personal choice (Turiel, 1983) , or behavior prohibited because it is imprudent or irrational (Machery & Mallon, 2010) . Psychologists concerned with the identification of moral norms have used different theoretical models to guide their search. Deontologically-oriented researchers have searched for acts perceived as "objectively obligated" (DeScioli & Kurzban, 2013; Miller et al., 1990; Shweder, 1990; Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987) or those additionally justified by "concepts of welfare, justice, and rights" (Turiel, Killen, & Helwig, 1987, p. 169-170) . A social-functional perspective looks for evolutionarilty-based social and psychological mechanisms that produce prosocial outcomes (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010) , especially those associated with automatic affective evaluations (Graham et al., 2013) . Others have emphasized the communicative and meaning-making aspects of morality, both intra-and inter-individual (e.g., Haste, 2013; Kesebir & Pyszczynski, 2011; Park, Edmondson, & HaleSmith, 2013; van den Bos, 2009 ).
How do laypeople distinguish between "moral" and "nonmoral" norm violations?
Laypeople may note a behavior's similarity to prototypical immoral acts, rather than abstract definitions (Rosch, 1975) . The prototype approach proposes that lay, natural language concepts are defined by a mental network of prototypical and less-prototypical examples, rather than being defined by abstract, clear-cut criteria (Rosch, 1975) . No published studies have yet reported lay prototypes of immoral acts, though prototypes of other concepts have been shown to affect cognition and reveal dimensions not predicted by theory (e.g., Fehr, 1988; Fontaine, Poortinga, Setiadi, & Markam, 2002; Kearns & Fincham, 2004; Smith, Smith, & Christopher, 2007; Walker & Pitts, 1998) .
Given the ongoing debate about how to theoretically define moral norms, and especially the potential inapplicability of deontological definitions to Chinese virtue ethics, a prototype approach can provide new data on what Chinese and Western people judge to be a "moral issue." In this case, we are interested in what is most prototypical of the natural language category "immoral." The current studies thus use Western and Chinese layperson-generated examples of "immoral" behaviors to examine what is most typical of this lay concept, and what characterizes immorality, in the minds of these participants.
The Current Studies
Three studies test the hypotheses that: a) compared to Chinese, Western laypeople are more likely to identify harmful behaviors as typically immoral, while Chinese are more likely to identify uncivilized behaviors as typically immoral; and b) a higher degree of harmfulness distinguishes Western immoral behaviors from other kinds of unacceptable behaviors, but Chinese immoral behaviors are distinguished from non-moral wrongs by a higher degree of incivility. To test these hypotheses, in Study 1, we asked Chinese and Western participants to list examples of immoral behavior, and in Study 2, the most typical behaviors were presented to new participants who labeled them as either "Immoral," "Wrong, but not immoral," or "Not wrong at all." Cultural differences in how often behaviors were called "immoral" are described. Finally, in Study 3, we asked participants to judge the harmfulness and incivility of the selected behaviors, and compared behaviors labeled "immoral" to those that were "wrong, but not immoral" to determine whether harmfulness or incivility better characterized the "immoral" category.
To ask participants for examples of what they label "immoral," rather than asking them to respond to a theory-based definition of immorality, allows us to cast a wide net for moral concerns and may have the best chance of capturing unpredicted lay-cultural concepts.
However, this means that the choice of equivalent words in Chinese and English is the definition of comparability. Translation of the key word "immoral" ("没道德/ mei dao de" or "不道德/ bu dao de") was thus given special attention, translated first by the bilingual authors, and verified by reference to multiple dictionaries (e.g., "English-Chinese Dictionary," 1997; and closed-ended (31 participants; "What is a better Chinese translation for the English word "immoral:" 不道德 or 邪恶的?", with the second option being another common dictionary translation that can be also glossed as "evil"). In the open-ended format, 15 of the 16 participants wrote "不道德" (bu dao de) as the translation of "immoral" (the one exception wrote an idiosyncratic variation of "bu dao de" / 不道德). In the closed-ended format, 31 of the 31 participants chose "bu dao de" / 不道德. There were no differences between Mainland and Hong Kong Chinese.
Participants from a variety of English-speaking Western countries (Australia, Canada and USA) and culturally distinct areas of China (Beijing, Hong Kong and Shanghai) were recruited. Ns were not pre-determined by power analysis; we attempted to reach around 100- Table 1 shows the most frequently mentioned categories from each of the five cities (for all 46 categories, see Table S1 in Supplemental Materials (full Table S1 excel file at http://tinyurl.com/no5c6hj)). While uncivil behaviors were frequently mentioned by Mainland Chinese, Western examples were more often of criminally harmful behavior. It is notable, for example, that "killing" was among the top 10 most frequently mentioned immoral behaviors by both Canadians and Australians, but almost never mentioned by Chinese participants; the converse applies to "spitting on the street" (see Table S1 ).
Results and Discussion
To illustrate cultural similarities and differences, Table 2 shows correlations across category frequency between the five cities. It should be noted that Hong Kong response patterns were significantly correlated with Western response patterns, although they were writing in Chinese in response to the same Chinese survey question as Mainland Chinese.
This likely reflects the influence of Hong Kong's bicultural heritage, especially in the realm of moral education (Cheng, 2004) , and shows that the examples generated were not solely controlled by the specific translation used for "immoral" (see Bond & King, 1985) . Chinese). Beijing participants were 87% non-religious and 8% Christian / Catholic, while Canadian, Australian, and Hong Kong participants were mostly non-religious (60%, 53%, and 67%, respectively) or Christian / Catholic (37%, 36%, and 29% respectively).
Materials. Twenty-six 4 behaviors were selected from Study 1 to represent the top 10 categories from any city or those that included 4% or more of examples within a city (a common cut-off point for prototype studies; see Table 1 ). The list was presented in the same order for all participants.
Procedures. Participants filled out a survey online (Canada, Australia, Hong Kong) or on paper in class (Beijing), for partial course credit (Canada, Beijing) or pay (Australia, $10 AUD, about $8 USD; Hong Kong, HKD$50, about $6.50 USD), in English (Canada, Australia) or Chinese (Hong Kong, Beijing). Participants read that the research concerned how people use the word, "immoral." They were presented with the list of 26 behaviors and asked to select which category was the best description of each behavior: "Immoral" / "不道 德的," "Wrong, but immoral isn't the best word" / "错的/不好的，不过"不道德"一词并不 贴切," or "Not wrong at all" / "根本没有错." This question was placed as the first page of a longer questionnaire.
Australian and Canadian samples were combined to serve as a "Western" sample. 5 To test for cultural differences between Western, Hong Kong and Beijing samples in the use of the word, "immoral," the cultural differences in the proportion of participants who chose "Immoral" were computed and confidence intervals calculated (as recommended by Newcombe & Altman (2000) and calculated with ESCI (Cummings, 2012) ); see Table 3 .
Additionally, χ 2 tests of cultural differences in the proportion of participants who chose "Immoral" versus either of the other two categories ("Wrong, but immoral isn't the best word"
and "Not wrong at all" combined) were assessed for each of the 26 behaviors with a Bonferroni corrected p-value of 0.05/26 = 0.0019 for each culture pair (see Table 3 wrong-but-not-immoral distinction should be driven more by perceptions of harmfulness than incivility.
Method
Participants. Paid online participants from across the USA (paid $1 USD) and
Mainland China (paid 9 Chinese Yuan, about $1 USD) were recruited through MTurk.com and SoJump.com, respectively, to fill out an online survey, and a university student sample from Beijing completed an on-paper survey for partial course credit. USA participants (N = 128, 53% male, Mage = 33; 97 Caucasian, 7 African-American, 15 Asian, 7 Latino/a, 1
American Indian/Alaskan Native) were 52% non-religious, 42% Protestant or Catholic, and 6%
other. Mainland China internet participants (N = 165, 33% male, Mage = 30, all Chinese) were 74% non-religious, 21% Buddhist, 3% Protestant or Catholic, and 3% other. Beijing university participants (N = 150, 30% male, Mage = 21, all Chinese) were 92% non-religious, 5% Buddhist, 1% Protestant or Catholic, and 2% other. Materials. Participants rated Study 2's 26 behaviors three times. As in Study 2, they first selected which word best described each behavior: "Immoral," "Wrong, but immoral isn't the best word," or "Not wrong at all." New to this study, they then rated each behavior on harmfulness (from 1 = "Extremely harmful" to 6 = "Not harmful at all") and incivility
(from 1 = "Extremely uncivilized" to 6 = "Has nothing to do with being civilized or uncivilized").
Results
Categorizations and comparison to Study 2. The two Chinese samples were combined, 8 and American / Chinese cultural differences in labeling behaviors as "immoral"
or otherwise were tested as in Study 2 (see Table 3 ; see Table S2 for additional comparisons).
Results replicated Study 2: 9 16 behaviors were categorized significantly differently by
American and Chinese participants (average absolute value % different = 27.1%, average 95% CIs + 8.6%; average phi = 0.25), and the largest cultural differences occurred for behaviors that seemed most and least harmful (e.g. spitting and killing).
Does harm, or incivility, best differentiate between immoral vs. wrong behaviors?
Within-person ratings.
Calculations. Participants marked an average of 13.6 of the 26 behaviors as "Immoral"
and 11.1 behaviors as "Wrong, but immoral isn't the right word" [henceforth "Wrong"]. To compare whether incivility or harmfulness best differentiated between these behavior categories, harmfulness and incivility ratings were reverse-coded for each item and two kinds of difference scores were calculated: For each participant the average harmfulness rating of behaviors that he/she had categorized as Wrong was subtracted from the average harmfulness rating of behaviors he/she had categorized as Immoral (harmfulness-difference), and the average incivility rating of Wrong behaviors was subtracted from the average incivility rating 8 Only two behaviors were rated significantly differently by the Mainland China Internet sample and the Beijing university student sample (average % different = 9.0%, average phi = .09; see Table S2 ). 9 Study 2 and 3's categorization results were also similar within cultures (see supplemental materials Table S2 ): No behaviors were rated significantly differently by Study 2 Westerners and Study 3 USA participants (average % different = 6.2%, average phi = .07), and only one behavior was rated significantly differently by Study 2 and Study 3 Mainland Chinese participants (average % different = 5.0%, average phi = .04).
of Immoral behaviors (incivility-difference). Larger numbers indicate a larger difference between "immoral" and "wrong" categories on that criterion.
Comparisons of the two behavior types. Figure 1 shows that both Chinese and
Americans rated "immoral" behaviors as both more harmful and more uncivil than "wrong"
behaviors. However, as predicted, for Americans, the difference between immoral and wrong behaviors was greater on "harmfulness" than "incivility;" while for Chinese, the difference was greater on "incivility" than "harmfulness. The above findings can be further illuminated by a correlational comparison across the 26 behaviors of how the cultural groups, on average, rate the behaviors (See Table 4 ). For each behavior we calculated the cultural group's average incivility ratings and average harmfulness ratings, and correlated these with the percentage of participants within that cultural group who categorized the behavior as immoral. Correlations of these values across the 26 behaviors (see Table 4 ) re-illustrate the above findings: the percentage of Americans who rated a behavior immoral was most highly correlated with the behaviors' average harmfulness ratings (r = .92, versus r = .75 for incivility ratings), while the percentage of Chinese who rated a behavior immoral was most highly correlated with their average incivility ratings (r = .83, versus r = .27 for harmfulness ratings). It is particularly informative to note that Chinese and Americans had quite high agreement on which behaviors were harmful (r = .80), showing that the main cultural difference is in the definition of immorality, not harmfulness. In Table 5 , which shows which behaviors were rated above-average on a given item, we can see that the Chinese immorality category includes both harmful and less harmful behaviors, and that some exceptionally harmful behaviors (killing, hurting others)
are not rated as highly immoral; instead, immorality and incivility ratings are highly similar.
These findings support our hypothesis that the category of immoral behaviors is better characterized by incivility than harm for Chinese, while the opposite is true of Westerners.
General Discussion
In the above three studies, we found that Western and Chinese participants use the word Finally, the division between "immoral" and "otherwise wrong" behaviors was determined more by the behavior's harmfulness than its incivility for Americans, but for Mainland Chinese, the behavior's incivility was a better guide than its harmfulness. This evidence suggests that "moral" judgments cannot be described as universally and particularly characterized by the perception of harm and suffering (as suggested by Gray et al., 2014) , and is more congruent with an interpretation of moral judgments' focal concerns being plural, and shifting as guided by culture (Graham et al., 2013) . It is consistent with a description of Chinese morality as primarily a form of virtue ethics, in which immoral behaviors are those that show one's character to be insufficiently polished; criminal behaviors, on the other hand, are too extreme to be relevant to virtue (Bakken, 2000; A. H.-Y. Chen, 2011; Rosemont & Ames, 2009 ).
Three Interpretations, and Future Research Needed
The Chinese and English concepts of "immoral" are obviously dissimilar, both in content (different specific behaviors described as "immoral") and in underlying concerns leading to the "immoral" label (harmful vs. uncivilized). Are they even the same concept at all? Despite the above documented agreement between Chinese dictionaries, sociologists, laypeople, and government bureaus that "immoral" is correctly translated to "bu daode," why is this regarded as the correct translation? To answer this question, we may return to the "cognitive" and "functional" definitions of morality.
One interpretation is that the word "immoral" in Chinese, despite being different in content, still evokes the same cognitive consequences as the English word "immoral." For example, it may be that among Chinese, moralized-uncivilized behaviors (in comparison to extremely harmful, or otherwise less moralized, behaviors) are more likely to be perceived as violating "sacred" values (Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000) , be universally and/or categorically impermissible (Miller et al., 1990; Turiel, 1983) , result in social ostracism (Wright, Cullum, & Schwab, 2008) , and evoke emotional responses (Cannon, Schnall, & White, 2010; Haidt, 2007; Krebs, 2008) . This would be consistent with Mainland China's current and historical emphasis on the morality of personal cultivation and appropriate behavior (Cua, 2007 ; Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China , 2006) and with research showing that a sense of "moral conviction" predicts support for social ostracism similarly in Mainland China and the USA (assessed by using the same translation of "moral" as in this paper; Skitka et al., 2013) , and may illuminate current conflicts within China, such as why anti-Mainland Chinese sentiment in Hong Kong focuses on the perceived "uncivilized behavior" of Mainland Chinese tourists (Luo, 2014, para. 23;  see also T.-P. Chen, 2014; Yung, 2014) . And yet it seems strange if, for example, a murderer would be less socially ostracized than someone who spits on the street. More research is needed to assess the similarity in cognition around moral judgment in Chinese and English, especially if Western definitions of "moral cognition" are based in deontological perspectives.
It also difficult to fit the seeming overlap between "moral" and "conventional" norms in Chinese (and the peripheralisation of some very harmful behaviors within the "immoral" category) into some definitions of the evolutionary and social function of moral norms, especially those that prioritize the prosocial function of morality as its special characteristic.
Even if killing is peripheralized as a moral concern, Chinese society does not permit random murders, as evidenced by the serious "social sanction" of the death penalty. But norms against criminal behavior are apparently not strongly relevant to moral norms in Chinese;
instead, the realm of law is seen as more appropriate for preventing and punishing crimes.
This leads to the difficult question about the social function of morality: if anti-social behavior such as murder is not centrally immoral, and yet is impermissible and sanctioned by another form of social regulation (law), does it make sense to define morality as uniquely fulfilling the function of promoting prosocial, cooperative behavior (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010) ?
This leads us to one more final implication: that Chinese may not categorize social norms in the same way as Westerners, and thus that a universally identifiable "moral"
category of norms may in fact not exist at all (Machery & Mallon, 2010) . How many aspects of the "moral cognition" that has been documented in Western societies, where harm is a it may be that the joints in social norms are different in China than they are in the USA; and if the joints are placed differently, so may be the cognitive ligaments and social-structural bones that support them.
The conceptual divide of social rules into "moral" (absolutely required) and "conventional" (permissible depending on social context) may be an accident of Western culture and philosophy, not a universal. 10 Is there anything universal about the cognition that arises when we call something a "moral" issue? More research is needed on the cognitive consequences of such lay natural-language differences, especially in multi-lingual contexts such as Hong Kong (Bond, 1983; S. X. Chen, Benet-Martínez, & Ng, 2014) .
Conclusion
A Chinese lay concept of "immorality" that is more applicable to spitting on the street than killing people has implications for how we define and study moral norms. Studies of moral cognition that use harmful and unjust behavior as stimuli (such as the classic "trolley problem") may be inappropriately influenced by Western lay instincts about morality, and theories about the unique evolutionary and social purposes of moral cognition may need to encompass moral systems in which behaviors acknowledged to be exceptionally destructive are relatively peripheral to morality. Finally, the potential of differently "jointed" categories of social norms in Chinese and English suggests that more research is needed to define how or whether "moral cognition" is universally distinctive from "norm cognition" in general (Machery & Mallon, 2010; Sinnott-Armstrong & Wheatley, 2013; Sripada & Stich, 2007 Sexual promiscuity or indecency (18%), Lying / deceiving others (8%), Stealing (8%), Invading others' privacy (6%), Adultery / two-timing (5%), Spitting on the street (4%), Harming others (4%), Harming others to benefit self (4%), Corruption / bribing (3%), Breaking laws / regulations / rules of public civility (3%) Shanghai (327 examples) Littering (8%), Spitting on street (7%), Stealing (6%), Breaking laws / regulations / rules of public civility (6%), Swearing (5%), Not giving up seat on bus (5%), Being unfilial (4%), Being selfish (4%), Unkind, inconsiderate, uncaring (4%), Lying / deceiving others (3%) Beijing (280 examples) Being unfilial (6%), Breaking laws / regulations / rules of public civility (6%), Betraying / selling-out others (6%), Adultery/ two-timing (6%), Irresponsible, don't keep promises, unpunctual (5%), Harming others to benefit self (5%), Stealing (5%), Being selfish (5%), Back-stabbing (4%), Lying / deceiving others (4%), Talking loudly (4%) .40* [.12, .62] .07 [-.23, .35] .17 [-.13, .44] Melbourne --.58** [.35, .75] .08 [-.22, .36] .26 [-.03, .51] Hong Kong ----.15 [-.15, .42] .22 [-.08, .48] Shanghai ------.46** [.26, .66] Note: Numbers in brackets are 95% confidence intervals. *p < .01. **p < .001. Note. Behaviors ordered from largest to smallest average Western-Mainland China differences (average phi of studies 2 and 3). CIs are 95% confidence intervals.
* p< 0.0019; exact value, 2-sided (see online supplementary Table S2 for χ  2 values) a The most frequent category was "Wrong, but immoral isn't the right word."
b The most frequent category was "Not wrong at all."
c For "12 To infringe…", N = 276 (see footnote 2).
d For "12 To infringe…", N = 187 (see footnote 2). 
